Perry: Taxes, Tariffs, and Subsidies: A History of Canadian Fiscal Development by Brecher, Irving
REVIEWS
TAXES, TARIFFS, AND SUBSmIES: A HISTORY OF CANADIAN FISCAL DEVELOP-
MENT. By J. Harvey Perry. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955.
2 Vols. Pp. xviii, 324; xi, 439. $25.00.
IT is a matter of general record that Canada ranks among the leading indus-
trial economies of the world.' This fact is now so widely recognized that it
no longer requires any special emphasis in economic discussion.
However, two aspects of Canadian development are worth underscoring:
first, the most spectacular economic changes have occurred during the past
fifteen years; and second, throughout the course of its history-and never more
so than in the post-World War II period-Canada's growth has been shaped
largely by its close orientation to the world economy in general and to that of
the United States in particular. Very much a reflection of the recentness of
the maturing process is the relatively primitive state from which Canadian
economic literature has only begun to emerge. At the same time, the broad
American "trade-investment" context in which Canada has developed makes
it increasingly important that the Dominion's economic achievements and prob-
lems be understood by its southern neighbor.
2
In the light of these twin considerations, the book under review is doubly
praiseworthy.3 It is commendable first as a comprehensive, carefully-written
historical account of Canada's fiscal development since Confederation in 1867.
And American readers (among others) will surely be impressed by this fact;
as well as by the implications, for the United States, of Canadian experience
1. There is no standard set of criteria for comparing national levels of industrialization
and economic wellbeing. Nor are the available quantitative estimates free from serious
shortcomings. But it is sufficient, for purposes of this review, to note that in 1949 (the
latest year for which broad statistical comparisons are available) Canada stood second
only to the United States in terms of per capita national income; and that few countries
can match Canada's present investment activity as a proportion of gross national ex-
penditure. See NATIONAL AND PER CAPITA INCOMES: SEVENTY COUNTIuES-1949, at 9-12,
14-16, U.N. Doc. No. ST/STAT/SER. E/i (1950); STATISTICS OF NATIONAL INCOME
AND EXPENDITURE 63-81, U.N. Doc. No. ST/STAT/SER. H/7 (1955).
2. This is not to ignore the fact of basic socio-economic ties between Canada and the
other members of the British Commonwealth; nor the real need for Canada and countries
other than the United States to acquire a thoroughgoing appreciation of economic institu-
tions and issues beyond their own borders. The point being made is, rather, that the
"informational imbalance" between Canada and the United States is great; that it is
heavily weighted against the latter; and that the United States, above all other countries,
should understand the Canadian economy. See Mackintosh, The Canadian Economy and
Its Competitors, 34 FOREIGN AFFAnS 117 (1955).
3. See also PIa'y, TAXATION IN CANADA (1954) (a study of the Dominion's current
tax system) ; PERIE, THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME IN CANADA (1952).
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with federalism, and by the powerful impact of American policy (and, indeed,
of American existence) on this experience.
The author begins his story with a lucid survey of the "Background of
Union.' 4 Canada in the middle of the nineteenth century was a vast, resource-
rich area whose western portion was largely unexplored and whose central and
eastern regions were sparsely settled and unevenly developed. It was, moreover,
an area plagued by rugged climate, by the most inadequate of transportation
and communciation facilities, and by a sharp cultural cleavage between English-
and French-speaking groups. Superimposed on this combination of problems
was the mother country's withdrawal of imperial trade preferences; and, far
more serious, the ever-present pull of the powerful and rapidly growing United
States-which only one year prior to Confederation had abrogated its free-
trade Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, and which stood as a chronic threat
to the survival of a country whose economic soundness left much to be desired.
In these adverse circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the constitutional
arrangements for the new union envisaged a strong federal government clothed
with both broad enumerated powers and all the ("residual") powers not specific-
ally assigned to the agreeing provinces. Nor is it difficult to understand, in terms
of the contemporary overwhelming importance of customs and excise duties,
the vesting of "direct" (income and death) taxation authority in the provinces
as well as in the federal government. The Fathers of Confederation would
have had to possess superhuman foresight to realize that, in the years to come,
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would so reinterpret the British
North American Act as to transfer to the provinces many of the powers that
had, in fact, been given to the national government ;5 and that the gradual
development of direct taxation as the chief source of tax revenue would
substantially impede federal efforts to implement a satisfactory government
allocation of fiscal authority and an effective contracyclical fiscal system.
This, then, was the outlook confronting the newborn federation into which
the provinces had been coaxed by federal assumption of their existing debts
and by generous unconditional ("statutory") federal subsidies--consisting of
"per capita" grants, grants "in support of government," and "special" grants-
intended mainly as compensation for the provinces' surrender of their powers
of indirect taxation. There followed a period of twenty-three "Years of Frus-
tration"" during which disappointing economic growth intensified a funda-
mental controversy over tariff policy centering on the alternatives of reciprocity
and protectionism. The year 1879 marks Canada's reluctant abandonment of
strenuous and persistent attempts to obtain a renewal of reciprocity with an
4. Part I.
5. By way of ironic contrast, the author notes that "in the United States the central
government, which was intended to be weak and subservient to the sovereign states, was
clothed with enormous powers by the interpretation placed on the constitution by the
Supreme Court." Pp. 8-9.
6. Part II.
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indifferent United States, although this objective continued to haunt Canadian
politics until shortly before the first World War. The National Policy of 1879
made protectionism a reality for Canada and was destined to exert a profound
influence on the future course of Canadian economic development.
7
In large measure, the 1890-1912 period spanned "Years of Fulfilment"
for the young Dominion. "The railways and other expensive overhead equip-
ment so laboriously constructed in the previous period began to pay off, and
a new spate of capital expenditures poured out as the crest of a flood." All
major sectors of the Canadian economy-agriculture, mining and manufactur-
ing- partook of this prodigious growth, and it was natural that Canadians
should decide that their National Policy was finally bearing fruit. This being
the case, their rejection in 1911 of the United States' belated reciprocity
offer was almost a foregone conclusion.
Meanwhile, subsidiary governments were beginning to flex their tax muscles.
The earlier period had witnessed provincial and municipal tax changes, but
they were either inconsequential or limited to relatively few governments. The
distinguishing characteristics of the years between 1890 and 1912 were: (1)
"the general entry of the provinces into the arena of direct taxation,"' 0 and
(2) the extraordinary degree to which Henry George's "single tax" found
acceptance in western municipal tax structures (only to fade out during World
War I and the twenties).'-
"Financing World War I, 1912-1912 proved, with the benefit of hindsight,
to be an object lesson in how public policy should not be conducted.' 3 To a
considerable extent, the cost of the war was met through loans or currency
expansion; and under these inflationary methods and the regressive tax struc-
ture employed, those individuals whose financial position was weakest suffered
the heaviest burden.14 Nor could the result have been otherwise in view of
7. Not a few Canadians--concerned about the limited extent to which other countries,
especially the United States, have followed the Canadian lead in the relaxation of trade
barriers since the end of World War I-are now giving deep thought to the question
whether the Dominion should again chart a "National Policy" course. For a cogently




11. With reference to the single tax, the author points out that "there was heated
public agitation for its adoption right across the country." P. 130.
12. Part IV.
13. The author does acknowledge an imposing set of rationalizations for this fact,
including: (1) the general assumption that the war would be both short and inexpensive;
(2) the unfortunate coincidence that the Dominion's "railway-salvaging" program reached
its peak at almost the same time as did the war expenditures; (3) governmental reluctance
to detract by high taxes from the position Canada had attained as a land of opportunity
in the decade before the war; and (4) the hard fact that, by the time of the war's outbreak,
the provinces and municipalities had already encroached heavily on the field of direct tax-
ation, and that they continued these inroads during the war.
14. Between the fiscal years 1915 and 1920, total tax revenues amounted to only
[Vol. 65
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the prevailing lack of appreciation of the "resource-channeling" role of taxation
in wartime, and the consequent misconception of borrowing as a device for
transferring the cost of war from the current generation to posterity. That
these perverse financing techniques did not fundamentally interfere with
Canada's wartime economic performance is to be attributed to the lightness of
the demands made on government finances by the war.'" Equally fortuitous-
and fortunate-was the fact that the federal financial program was not hampered
by the lack of fiscal co-ordination with the policies of the provincial govern-
Ments, which were making haphazard upward changes in, and additions to,
their tax structures.
Nevertheless, by 1920 the Dominion had introduced three major revenue
instruments-excise taxes and personal and corporate income taxes. Despite
the reluctance with which this was done and the caution with which the new
taxes were exploited, the foundation had been laid for a broad revenue system
freed from exclusive reliance on the tariff. The "Troublesome Twenties"'"
witnessed first the adoption and then the virtual elimination of the only modern
federal tax weapon still lacking at the end of the war-the general sales tax.
More important, those years "brought a resurgence of the economic expansion
that had begun in 1896, and a further rapid development of municipal and
provincial activities temporarily held back by the war. By contrast, the Dominion
government, laboring under the burden of heavy outlays for debt interest and
war pensions, played a diminishing role as the decade progressed.' 17
But the boom of the twenties had developed in an atmosphere of general
ignorance of the cyclical process.'3 And all levels of government had
become increasingly vulnerable to any sudden decline in economic activity-
the Dominion through a reversal of its course away from dependence on the
tariff, and the provinces and municipalities through heavy expenditure com-
mitments and increasing dependence on taxation of postponable luxury-type
consumption spending. On this flimsy institutional structure, the "Great De-
pression"'19 burst with unprecedented violence. The grim story of the thirties
has been fully told in numerous other contexts. Paraphrasing the author's
account of Canadian fiscal developments, it is sufficient to note that perhaps
never was so much done by so many governments to aggravate such a wide-
spread and crushing economic burden. At the very time when tax rates should
have been lowered and expenditures increased, the most vigorous budget-
one-third of combined (war and other) expenditures; and "the personal income tax, one
of the great pillars of the revenue system in World War II, produced less than 1 per cent
of tax revenues in the earlier war." Pp. 163-64.
15. "It is estimated that war expenditure did not exceed 10 per cent of the national
income during World War I, while in the later conflict at the peak nearly half of the
national income was being turned to this purpose." P. 143.
16. Part V.
17. P. 193.
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balancing efforts were made. Sizeable deficits were often incurred, to be sure,
but only because incomes were too low to provide the desired revenue, and
economic misery so great as to require substantial relief expenditures by the
federal government. By the end of the thirties, moreover, the policies of severe
retrenchment pursued by the subsidiary governments-which were, after all,
harrassed by the fact of limited borrowing power in the face of enormous need for
funds- had produced the double effect of seriously weakening whatever con-
tracyclical measures the federal authorities did undertake and reducing Do-
minion-provincial fiscal relations to a state of near-chaos.
Out of this economic catastrophe came the 1940 Report of the Royal Com-
mission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Report), "a land-
mark in Canadian history comparable to Lord Dunham's Report of a
century before." 20 Quite apart from its pioneering contribution to Canadian
economic research,21 the Commission is notable for its unqualified advo-
cacy of contracyclical budgetary policy, and for the bold recommendation
that the Canadian Constitution be amended so as to vest in the federal govern-
ment exclusive control of the personal income tax, all corporation taxes and
the succession duty. Compensation for the provinces' loss of taxing power was
to be rendered through (1) the Dominion's assumption of provincial debts and
prime responsibility for unemployment relief, and (2) payment of "fiscal" and
"emergency" grants to the provinces. But although the Report has strongly
influenced subsequent Canadian fiscal development, its main proposals (de-
scribed in part XI of the book under review, along with earlier and more recent
subsidy schemes) became casualties of the war and of a general reluctance to
implement the sweeping changes suggested.
Canada proceeded, however, to apply itself with remarkable energy and
intelligence to "Financing World War II. ' '22 Armed with a mature approach
to fiscal theory, as well as with the Wartime Tax Agreements by which the
provinces surrendered their income tax rights in return for federal grants,
the Dominion succeeded in covering by taxation more than half of its enormous
wartime expenditures-"almost the maximum of accomplishment, and . . .
more than most countries achieved. ' 23 The two chief instruments for reaching
this result were the excess profits tax and the personal income tax. The
most interesting feature of the excess profits tax was the elaborateness of its
provisions defining "profits" and making allowance for tax relief under special
circumstances; while the personal income tax "was given a greater prominence
in the federal budget than ever before or since."
24
20. P. 307.
21. See, especially, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COmmISSION ON DOMINION-PROvINCIAL
.ELATIONS bk. I (1940), and the following studies prepared for the Commission in 1939:
S. BATES, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENTS; F. A. KNOX, DOMINION







In the final phase of development-"The Postwar Tax Experiment, 1946-
54" 2 -- the keynote has been income and commodity tax reform designed to
yield substantial compliance with the requirements of equity, income-employ-
ment stabilization, incentives to enterprise, and efficient administration. The
1947 balance-of-payments crisis, the 1950 outbreak of war in Korea and the
1951 enactment of a universal old age pensions law did, however, result "in
the temporary restoration of tax rates at levels as high as those of World War
II.120' This has, furthermore, been the period during which: (1) under
five-year agreements signed in 1947 and 1952 (excluding Quebec and On-
tario, and Quebec respectively) provincial and municipal taxes were su-
spended in return for Dominion compensation; (2) Newfoundland in
1949 became the tenth Canadian province on the basis of tax-subsidy arrange-
ments similar to those made with other members of the Confederation; (3)
grave fiscal problems, temporarily set aside by wartime developments, have
re-emerged to press heavily upon subsidiary governments struggling, with
limited revenue sources, to provide the vast network of services demanded by
an economy bursting with economic growth; and (4) through skilled nego-
tiation on the international front (notably with reference to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade signed originally in 1947) the Dominion has made
a significant contribution to world-wide lowering of commercial barriers.
Such, then, are the general outlines of Canadian fiscal history as definitively
developed by Mr. Perry. There can be no question but that, in his careful
marshalling and ordering of this complex material, he has performed an
invaluable service for all those interested in this vital sphere of the Canadian
economy. The author has also furnished the reader with a detailed factual
account of "Main Events in Taxation, 1650-1954" ;27 a thorough tabular
presentation of Canadian fiscal statistics2s which would otherwise be available
only in widely scattered sources, and often in a form not easily understood;
and an exhaustive bibliography of official and private sources dating from the
earliest years of Canadian history to the present. 29 Finally, not the least of his
achievements has been to create a vivid picture of Canada's rapidly growing
awareness of the fiscal obstacles to smoother economic development and her
interest in subjecting these obstacles to scientific analysis.
In all fairness, however, some critical remarks remain to be made. The
author himself is quick to concede a serious deficiency in interpretation of the
events that he has so voluminously recorded.30 It would, for example, have
been most illuminating to discover the reasons why the problem of inter-govern-
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was ;31 to gain deeper insight into the familiar observation that effective pursuit
of contracyclical fiscal policy at the federal level is blocked by the failure to
arrive at such an allocation; to ascertain the general principles that should guide
the allocation of revenue and expenditure powers between provincial and
municipal governments; and to learn, in more precise terms, of the impact of
Canadian tariff policy on the country's economic growth. Mr. Perry could
hardly include these issues among the fiscal "developments [that] speak for
themselves."
32
Admittedly, lightness of interpretation may be the necessary price to be
paid for thorough documentation of a historical record. It is, nevertheless,
difficult to avoid the view that the price need not have been so high; and that it
might have been reduced by incorporating an abbreviated part IX ("Subsidies
and Other Fiscal Arrangements, 1867-1954") into the rest of the text, and by
less detailed treatment of fiscal events at the subsidiary levels of government. 33
Such a change of emphasis, though by no means negligible, would not have
altered the basic narrative theme, and might, in fact, have produced a more
tightly-knit interpretative story.34
But the author himself has dropped the gentle hint that his partial confes-
sion of failure on the "interpretation" front may be "a promise of yet another
book."3 5 This might well be a more fruitful course of action than the reviewer's
suggestion that historical narrative should not be so comprehensive as to compel
considerable sacrifice in terms of critical analysis. It is therefore to be hoped
that Mr. Perry will soon find it feasible to build further upon his description
of the basic fiscal structures. 36
In any event, his present effort stands solidly on its own as a major
addition to Canadian economic literature. It is a book that richly deserves to
be read by expert and laymen alike-and read with as much care as the author
has obviously taken in writing it.
IRVING BRECHERt
31. The latest of a long series of inconclusive Dominion-Provincial Conferences was
held in October 1955. Against a background of publicly expressed views that have often
been something less than enlightened, the various governments are now considering
a series of alternative "fiscal allocation" proposals submitted to that Conference.
32. P. viii.
33. In the interest of both clarity and succinctness, the author should, at the very least,
have attached a concluding summary to each set of fiscal changes traced for the provincial
and municipal governments.
34. The reviewer would not deny the contention that a detailed financial history of
Canadian subsidiary governments has long been sorely needed. But, on grounds of
manageable length for a single study, he would question the soundness of combining
such a history with an equally full account of federal financial operations.
35. P. viii.
36. Indeed, the book under review represents just such a "further building" upon
the author's TAXATION IN CANADA (1954).
-Staff Member, Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects; Associate Pro-
fessor of Economics, McGill University.
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